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Trade Secrets, Safe Harbors, and
International Trade
W. Keith Robinson*
The Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) is a proposed trade agreement that
establishes terms for trade and business between the United States and eleven
Pacific Rim nations. The United States has withdrawn from the TPP, but
interest in the agreement remains because some of its provisions serve as a
template for future international trade deals. This article focuses on the TPP
provisions concerning trade secrets and Internet Service Provider (ISP) Safe
Harbors. While both provisions mirror U.S. law, they do lack certain “safe-
guards.” Commentators have observed that the absence of these safeguards
unfairly favor the interests of large corporations and rights holders over indi-
viduals and the public. This article argues for a flexible approach that encour-
ages participating countries to include safeguards in future trade agreements
that are missing from the TPP. Adding these safeguards will balance the in-
terests of individuals with the interests of corporations and large rights
holders.
I. INTRODUCTION
The Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP) is a proposed trade agreement in-
volving the United States of America and several Pacific Rim countries.1
While the United States has withdrawn from the TPP, future international
trade deals will most likely use many of its provisions as a template.2 Ac-
cordingly, it is still useful to study this proposed agreement and its
provisions.
The agreement includes several intellectual property provisions.3 This
article examines problematic parts of two provisions in the TPP—the trade
secret provisions4 and the ISP Safe Harbor provisions.5 In many ways, the
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1. Trans-Pacific Partnership, OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REP., ch. 18, Feb. 4,
2016, https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/trans-pacific-part
nership/tpp-full-text (last visited Jan. 24, 2018) [hereinafter TPP].
2. See Robert J. Samuelson, The TPP Lives—Maybe, WASH. POST (Feb. 15, 2017)
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/the-tpp-lives—maybe/2017/02/15/
c27cdfac-f3a8-11e6-b9c9-e83fce42fb61_story.html?utm_term=.a795fd85fd98
(explaining that the TPP, or at least some of its provisions, are still politically
and economically popular with many in Washington, D.C.).
3. TPP, supra note 1, ch. 18.
4. Id. art. 18.78.
5. Id. art. 18.82.
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TPP provisions mirror U.S. law.6 However, both provisions differ from U.S.
law in a significant way.
Specifically, both the trade secret and ISP provisions of the TPP do not
include safeguards that are present in their U.S. counterparts.7 For example,
the trade secret provisions fail to include language that would protect
whistleblowers who disclose subject matter that is allegedly a trade secret.8
Similarly, the ISP service provider provision does not include a counter noti-
fication provision that would provide users accused of posting infringing
content an opportunity to respond to a takedown notice.9
Critics of the TPP have argued these provisions unfairly favor rights
holders and weaken the rights of individuals and the public. For example, in
the absence of a whistleblower exemption for disclosing trade secrets, the
threat of litigation might discourage whistleblowing activities, which could
also harm the public at large. Similarly, there is an argument that, absent a
counter notification system, copyright holders can abuse the takedown notice
procedure in a way that is detrimental to users.
So, should the TPP or future trade deals based on the TPP include provi-
sions that arguably level the playing field between rights holders and the
public? The answer depends on a few factors, including the goal of the TPP
and the country or countries in question. One general criticism of interna-
tional trade deals is that they are a one-size-fits-all solution for countries that
may be in very different stages of development.10 Less restrictive IP laws
benefit developing countries to a certain point. A more rigid IP regime may
help the developing country attract outside investment from foreign busi-
nesses. The more rigid IP regime could in turn benefit businesses within the
country as well. Whether these absent provisions in the trade secret and ISP
Safe Harbor provisions are needed may depend upon where a country is in its
financial and technological development.
Accordingly, one solution may be to include such provisions but make it
optional for countries to adopt them. Another option would be to require that
all countries adopt the provisions within a certain time. This flexible ap-
proach would allow each individual country to decide when it is best for it to
implement the subject exceptions. Further, it would provide some assurance
to the more developed countries in the agreement that over time each party to
6. Compare Defend Trade Secrets Act, Pub. L. No. 114-153 (2016) [hereinafter
DTSA] with TPP, supra note 1, ch. 18.
7. Compare DTSA, supra note 6, with TPP, supra note 1, arts. 18.78,
18.81–18.82.
8. See TPP, supra note 1, art. 18.78.
9. Id. arts. 18.81–18.82.
10. Sean M. Flynn et al., The U.S. Proposal for an Intellectual Property Chapter in
the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement, 28 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 105, 106
(2012).
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the agreement can balance the rights of the individuals and the public with
that of rights holders.
This article proceeds in two parts. Part II summarizes the trade secret
and ISP provisions of the TPP and highlights the critical differences between
those provisions and their U.S. counterparts. Part III explains why the differ-
ences highlighted in Part II are important and argues for the inclusion of
flexible whistleblower and counter-notification provisions. An inclusion of
flexible provisions that balance the interest of rights holders and the public
will benefit participating countries at various stages of their development,
which in turn has the potential to strengthen all parties involved in the TPP or
similar trade deals.
II. BACKGROUND
This part introduces the trade secret and ISP Safe Harbor provisions of
the TPP, summarizes the related United States’ provisions, and highlights
some critical differences between them. Namely, the TPP trade secret provi-
sion does not include any protections for whistleblowers and the ISP Safe
Harbor provision does not include a counter-notification procedure.
A. Summary of TPP Provisions
The TPP’s IP provisions include sections on patents, trademarks, copy-
rights, trade secrets and other IP related laws. One goal of these provisions of
the TPP is to make it easier for small businesses to enter markets in new
countries.11 This section summarizes the provisions of the TPP that are re-
lated to trade secrets and the ISP Safe Harbor.
1. Trade Secrets
Chapter 18, Article 78 of the TPP discusses trade secrets.12 Article 18.78
incorporates by reference the definition of a trade secret by specifying that
trade secrets include undisclosed information “as provided for in Article 39.2
of the TRIPS agreement.”13 This definition is consistent with the Uniform
Trade Secrets Act, which many states in the United States have adopted.14
Generally, under this definition, a trade secret is any information that derives
11. Press Release, U.S. Trade Representative, Summary of the Trans-Pacific Part-
nership Agreement (Oct. 4, 2015), https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/
press-office/press-releases/2015/october/summary-trans-pacific-partnership.
12. TPP, supra note 1, art. 18.78.
13. Id.
14. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1 (1985); Roberta L. Horton et al., Extensive IP
Provisions in the Trans-Pacific Partnership, ARNOLD & PORTER ADVISORY
(Nov. 20, 2015), http://www.apks.com/en/perspectives/publications/2015/11/
extensive-ip-provisions-in-the-tpp.
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independent economic value from not generally being known and is the sub-
ject of reasonable efforts to maintain its secrecy.15
Paragraph 1 of Article 18.78 requires parties to enforce laws aimed at
preventing the misappropriation or unauthorized use of trade secrets by third
parties, including state-owned actors.16 The TPP includes terms for criminal-
izing trade secret theft but fails to specify civil remedies for trade secret
misappropriation.17 Paragraph 1 defines the scope of activities that each
party’s laws must prevent as those “contrary to honest commercial prac-
tices,” including breaches of contract and confidence.18
Paragraph 2 of Article 18.78 gives countries the option of imposing
criminal procedures and penalties for at least one of three listed offenses: “(a)
the unauthorised and wilful access to a trade secret held in a computer sys-
tem; (b) the unauthorised and wilful misappropriation of a trade secret, in-
cluding by means of a computer system; or (c) the fraudulent disclosure, or
alternatively, the unauthorised and wilful disclosure, of a trade secret, includ-
ing by means of a computer system.”19
Given the offenses listed in Paragraph 2, Paragraph 3 provides parties
the option to limit the criminal penalties imposed to one out of five enumer-
ated cases in which: “(a) the acts are for the purposes of commercial advan-
tage or financial gain; (b) the acts are related to a product or service in
national or international commerce; (c) the acts are intended to injure the
owner of such trade secret; (d) the acts are directed by or for the benefit of or
in association with a foreign economic entity; or (e) the acts are detrimental
to a Party’s economic interests, international relations, or national defence or
national security.”20
Given this brief overview of the trade secret provisions, the next section
briefly summarizes the ISP Safe Harbor provisions in the TPP.
2. ISP Safe Harbor
The ISP Safe Harbor provision is designed to exclude ISPs from liabil-
ity if they remove infringing material from their services upon learning of an
unauthorized use of copyrighted material.21 Article 18.81 generally defines
an ISP as “a provider of online services for the transmission, routing, or
providing of connections for digital online communications, between or
among points specified by a user, of material of the user’s choosing.”22
15. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1839(3)(B) (2016).
16. TPP, supra note 1, art. 18.78, ¶ 1.
17. See id. ¶ 2.
18. Id. ¶ 1.
19. Id. ¶ 2.
20. Id. ¶ 3.
21. See id. arts. 18.81–18.82.
22. See TPP, supra note 1, art. 18.81(a).
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Article 18.82 requires that parties make legal remedies available to
rights holders for copyright infringement through a legal framework that in-
centivizes cooperation between rights holders and ISPs and precludes liabil-
ity of ISPs for infringement that falls into several enumerated functions.23
Those functions include:
(a) transmitting, routing or providing connections for material
without modification of its content or the intermediate and tran-
sient storage of that material done automatically in the course of
such a technical process; (b) caching carried out through an auto-
mated process; (c) storage, at the direction of a user, of material
residing on a system or network controlled or operated by or for
the Internet Service Provider; and (d) referring or linking users to
an online location by using information location tools, including
hyperlinks and directories.24
Upon actual knowledge or upon becoming aware of infringing material,
Article 18.82 exempts ISPs from liability if they (1) remove the infringing
material; and (2) promptly notify the party whose material was removed.25
Article 18.82 also requires ISPs to restore content subject to a valid counter
notice but only in countries that have counter notification laws.26 Further,
Article 18.82 requires each party to provide procedures that allow copyright
owners to learn the identify of alleged infringers to protect and enforce their
copyright.27
The language of the text requires parties impose penalties upon those
who issue wrongful takedown notices.28 It further provides takedown notices
must be verified by a decision-making body consisting of ISPs and copyright
owners.29 However, the TPP provisions do not require rights holders to have
a good faith belief that the material subject to their takedown request is being
used unlawfully.30
23. Id. art. 18.82, ¶ 1.
24. Id. art. 18.78, ¶ 2.
25. Id. art. 18.78, ¶ 3.
26. Id. ¶¶ 4–5.
27. Id. ¶ 7.
28. Jeremy Malcolm, The Final Leaked TPP Text is All That We Feared, ELEC.
FRONTIER FOUND. (Oct. 9, 2015), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2015/10/final-
leaked-tpp-text-all-we-feared.
29. Id.
30. Annemarie Bridy, A User-Focused Commentary On The TPP ISP Safe
Harbors, INTELLECTUAL PROP. WATCH (Nov. 24, 2015), https://www.ip-watch
.org/2015/11/24/a-user-focused-commentary-on-the-tpp-isp-safe-harbors/.
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Finally, the TPP provides for certain remedies for rights holders and
users.31 Exemplary or statutory damages are available to copyright plain-
tiffs.32 Enhanced damages are unavailable to users who win abusive take-
down cases against rights holders.33
B. The Differences Between the TPP Trade Secret and ISP Safe
Harbor Provisions, and U.S. Law
This section summarizes critical differences between U.S. law and the
TPP trade secret and ISP Safe Harbor provisions. Specifically, the TPP trade
secret provision does not include any protections for whistleblowers and the
ISP Safe Harbor provision does not include a counter-notification procedure.
1. Trade Secrets
The TPP mirrors the basic concepts of other agreements such as the
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
(TRIPS).34 For example, the civil trade secret provisions are very similar to
their TRIPS counterparts.35 However, there are a few key differences be-
tween the TPP trade secret provisions and the treatment of trade secrets
under U.S. law. For example, one commentator has argued the definition of
trade secret in the TPP is too broad and, thus, disadvantages former employ-
ees turned entrepreneurs.36 Second, in contrast to U.S. law, the trade secret
provision of the TPP does not require a trade secret owner to be harmed or
for some party to have benefited from the theft for a criminal penalty to be
enforced.37 In addition, the willful access of a trade secret on a computer is
31. TPP, supra note 1, art. 18.72, 18.82.
32. See id. art. 18.74, ¶¶ 6–7.
33. Bridy, supra note 30.
34. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15,
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, An-
nex 1C, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299, 33 I.L.M. 1197 [hereinafter TRIPS]. See Barry
Sookman, TPP and Trade Secrets: A Wonderful Idea, BARRYSOOKMAN.COM
(Dec. 31, 2015), http://www.barrysookman.com/2015/12/31/tpp-and-trade-
secrets-a-wonderful-idea/ (explaining the TPP trade secret provisions are like
that of other treaties).
35. Id.
36. Dan Breznitz, Trans-Pacific Partnership is a Wonderful Idea—for China,
GLOBE & MAIL (Dec. 26, 2015, 5:00 AM EST), http://www.theglobeandmail
.com/report-on-business/rob-commentary/trans-pacific-partnership-is-a-won-
derful-idea-for-china/article27939142/ (criticizing trade secret provision of
TPP).
37. Jeremy Malcolm, Cyber-Espionage and Trade Agreements: An Ill-Fitting and
Dangerous Combination, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (Oct. 17, 2014), https://
www.eff.org/deeplinks/2014/10/cyber-espionage-and-trade-agreements-ill-fit-
ting-and-dangerous-combination.
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an offense under the TPP, even if trade secret subject matter is not copied or
disclosed.38 Finally, Article 18.78 does not include any safeguards for indi-
viduals such as whistleblowers, investigative journalists, or security research-
ers who gain access to trade secret information.39 Not only does such a
provision benefit a specific individual, but it is also viewed as a public safe-
guard since the information at issue may be of vital interest and benefit to the
public.40 The absence of a similar whistleblower provision from the TPP sup-
ports the narrative that the TPP favors large corporations and rights holders
over the public.
2. ISP Safe Harbor
Similarly, rights holders seem to be the primary beneficiaries of the
TPP’s ISP Safe Harbor provisions. There are several key differences between
the TPP ISP Safe Harbors and those included in the DMCA.41 First, unlike
the DMCA, the TPP does not include a provision requiring parties to termi-
nate the accounts of repeat infringers.42 Second, the fact the TPP does not
require rights holders to assert takedown notices under a good faith belief
that the subject material is being used unlawfully eliminates a tool used to
deter abusive takedown requests.43 Furthermore, while the TPP requires that
parties make monetary awards available to users that win takedown abuse
cases, it does not require awards of attorney fees and costs.44 A final major
difference between the TPP and the DMCA provisions is that whether coun-
tries implement a counter-notification procedure depends on whether that
country has such a law or procedure in place.45 Accordingly, TPP countries
without existing counter-notification procedures are not required to imple-
ment them.46 This leaves users in some countries unable to make administra-
tive challenges to takedown requests by rights holders.47
38. Id. at 2.
39. Moner Amir, Final TPP Language on Trade Secret Protection Disclosed,
TRADE SECRETS WATCH (Oct. 22, 2015), http://blogs.orrick.com/trade-secrets-
watch/2015/10/22/final-tpp-language-on-trade-secret-protection-disclosed/
(summarizing trade secret provisions of the TPP).
40. Malcolm, Cyber-Espionage and Trade Agreements, supra note 37 (criticizing
the trade secret provision for not including exceptions).
41. Compare Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998, 17 U.S.C. § 101 et seq.
(2017)) [hereinafter DMCA] with TPP, supra note 1, art. 18.81–18.82.
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III. IMPLEMENTING ADDITIONAL SAFEGUARDS
Given the discussion in Part II, this part analyzes the implications of the
differences between U.S. law and the trade secrets and ISP Safe Harbor pro-
visions of the TPP. Considering a pro-rights holder stance, this part provides
recommendations for implementing additional safeguards in a flexible man-
ner. A flexible implementation of the safeguards will allow countries to re-
spond to the concerns of individuals and the public as their economy and IP
regime evolve.48
A. Upsetting the Balance Between Rights Holders and the Public
One general criticism of the TPP and similar trade deals is that the IP
provisions strengthen the position of rights holders while weakening individ-
ual rights in ways that could also be detrimental to the public.49 For example,
because the trade secret provision of the TPP does not suggest parties exempt
whistleblowers from liability, it disincentives individual actions that in some
circumstances may benefit the public at large.50 In turn, rights holders may
unfairly treat individuals they perceive as a threat to disclose trade secret
information.51
Critics of the TPP also argue its failure to require all parties to partici-
pate in a counter notification system makes its takedown procedures overly
protective and more likely to be abused by rights holders.52 For example, the
ISP Safe Harbor provisions strengthen the ability of ISPs to issue takedown
notices without fear of being challenged by users.53 This may unfairly
strengthen the power of rights holders while weakening the impact of indi-
viduals on the IP system.54
B. Establishing a Balance Between Rights Holders and the Public
To establish a balance between rights holders and the public, the TPP or
any other trade deal should give parties the option to implement additional
safeguards over a determined period of time.55 Additional safeguards will
48. See, e.g., Summary of the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement, supra note 11.
49. See, e.g., Bridy, supra note 30.
50. See generally Marie Brenner, The Man Who Knew Too Much, VANITY FAIR
(May 1996), http://www.vanityfair.com/magazine/1996/05/wigand199605 (de-
tailing the story of Jeffrey Wigand, the former head of research and develop-
ment at a tobacco company and a famous whistleblower).
51. Amir, supra note 39.
52. Bridy, supra note 30.
53. Id.
54. See id.
55. See, e.g., Summary of the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement, supra note 11.
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balance the interest of the public with that of rights holders.56 Requiring that
countries implement these safeguards on their own time frame will assist
each party in ensuring that its IP system evolves at the pace they desire.57
The Electronic Frontier Foundation has argued that the absence of a
whistleblower exemption or safeguard may chill the speech of those seeking
to publicize information that may be of interest and benefit to the public’s
health and safety.58 Accordingly, similar to the DTSA, the TPP should in-
clude a safeguard for whistleblowers.59 This provision will exempt individu-
als from liability for disclosing trade secrets.60 This safeguard would
encourage individuals to come forward with information that could be useful
in maintaining public safety.61 Further, it prevents businesses from using liti-
gation as a tactic to silence whistle blowers.62
Concerning the ISP Safe Harbor provision, the TPP should also require
parties to implement a counter notification system like that of the DMCA.63
This safeguard would allow users to dispute a takedown notice received by
an ISP.64 Accordingly, this increases the ability of users to dispute arguable
takedown notices and requires rights holders to be more precise in issuing
takedown notices.65
One challenge with all trade deals, like the TPP, is that provisions can
impact parties differently, depending upon the characteristics of each coun-
try.66 IP provisions that are prevalent in some countries may not be the best
fit for others.67 Implementing the safeguards mentioned above may harm
some countries, whose goal is to attract businesses and content owners with
56. See Bridy, supra note 30, at 2.
57. See Summary of the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement, supra note 11.
58. Amir, supra note 39; Malcolm, Cyber-Espionage and Trade Agreements, supra
note 37.
59. Malcolm, Cyber-Espionage and Trade Agreements, supra note 37.
60. See Daniel Hurson, United States: The Whistleblower Protections of the De-
fend Trade Secrets Act Could Have a Broad Impact—But Only if Employees




61. Malcolm, Cyber-Espionage and Trade Agreements, supra note 37.
62. See id.
63. See Bridy, supra note 30.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. See, e.g., id.; Summary of the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement, supra note
11.
67. See, e.g., Bridy, supra note 30, at 3.
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IP protections that favor rights holders.68 But, countries may want to imple-
ment these safeguards as their IP system evolves.69
Accordingly, parties should be given the option to implement the above-
mentioned safeguards over a specified period.70 This flexibility would allow
parties to make a policy decision based on their country’s unique characteris-
tics.71 Further, it eventually ensures all parties will provide important safe-
guards for users and the public.72
IV. CONCLUSION
Future international trade deals should provide parties the option to
phase in two key provisions over time that are missing from the TPP. First,
the trade secret provision should include an exemption for whistleblowers.73
Second, the ISP Safe Harbor provision should include a counter notification
procedure.74 Some commentators view the IP provisions of the TPP as favor-
ing rights holders over individuals and the public.75 The whistleblower ex-
emption included in the DTSA benefits the public by providing
whistleblowers with incentives to come forward.76 The counter notification
procedure provides individuals and smaller entities with a way to respond to
unwarranted takedown requests.77 Finally, the option to phase in these safe-
guards provides parties with the flexibility to choose a time that is right in the
evolution of their IP laws to add important safeguards for individuals and the
public.78
68. See, e.g., id.




73. Malcolm, Cyber-Espionage and Trade Agreements, supra note 37.
74. See Bridy, supra note 30.
75. See, e.g., id.; Malcolm, Cyber-Espionage and Trade Agreements, supra note
37.
76. Malcolm, Cyber-Espionage and Trade Agreements, supra note 37.
77. See Bridy, supra note 30.
78. See Summary of the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement, supra note 11.
